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We estimate the effect of active labour market programmes on the exit rate to regular 
employment for non-western immigrants in Denmark who receive social assistance. We use 
the timing-of-events duration model and rich administrative data. We find large positive post-
programme effects, and, surprisingly, even most in-programme effects are positive. The 
effects are largest for subsidized employment programmes, but effects are also large and 
significant for direct employment programmes and other programmes. The effects are larger 
if programmes begin after six months of unemployment. Implications of our estimates are 
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1. Introduction 
In most European countries employment rates of non-western immigrants are very low 
compared to employment rates of natives (OECD, 2005), and this has become a major policy 
issue because of the important consequences for aggregate labour supply, economic growth 
and the long-run fiscal sustainability issues. Furthermore, it is often argued that labour market 
integration of immigrants may be important for social integration and cohesion, and there may 
be long-term effects through integration of children of immigrants.  
  In this paper, we investigate the effect of active labour market programmes 
(ALMPs) on the duration until regular employment for non-western immigrants in Denmark 
receiving social assistance (cash benefits). The reason why we focus on social assistance 
recipients is that the majority of non-western immigrants in Denmark are not members of an 
unemployment insurance fund, implying that they are not entitled to unemployment insurance 
benefits when they become unemployed; instead they receive social assistance, and they are 
heavily over-represented among social assistance recipients, especially among long-term 
recipients.  
Like other recipients of social assistance in Denmark, immigrants are offered 
active labour market programmes administered by the job centres. Because a large fraction of 
non-western immigrants are social assistance recipients, it is very important to assess whether 
these programmes have positive effects on immigrants’ employment prospects. If some 
programmes show positive effects, further targeting of such programmes to immigrants may 
have large positive effects on labour market integration and, indirectly, on social integration 
in general.  
  We use rich administrative data covering all immigrants in Denmark, and we 
employ the timing-of-events duration model of Abbring and van den Berg (2003).
1 We find 
large positive post-programme effects, and, surprisingly, most in-programme effects are 2 
positive too. We find the largest effects for subsidized employment programmes, but effects 
are also large and significant for direct employment programmes as well as for other 
programmes. Effects are larger for programmes beginning after six months of unemployment. 
Implications of our estimates are illustrated by calculating marginal effects on the expected 
duration to regular employment over a five-year period for typical starting times and 
programme durations. Subsidized employment programmes shorten the social assistance spell 
by about 10 months for women and 15 months for men. The effect of direct employment 
programmes is 3.7 months for women and 4.6 months for men, and the effect of other 
programmes is 1.5 month for women and 2.6 months for men.  
  Only very few papers have investigated the effects of ALMPs specifically for 
immigrants.  Clausen et al. (2009) study effects of programmes offered to newly arrived non-
western immigrants in Denmark. They find that post-programme effects on the hazard rate to 
regular employment are significantly positive for wage subsidy programmes, but not for other 
types of programmes.   Bolvig et al. (2003) reach a similar conclusion investigating effects of 
ALMPs for social assistance recipients in the second largest municipality in Denmark, but 
they do not estimate separate effects for natives and immigrants. 
The overall finding in previous studies on programmes for unemployed workers 
is that earnings effects as well as employment effects are small; see the surveys in Stanley et 
al. (1999), Heckman et al. (1999), Kluve (2006), and Card et al. (2010). Stanley et al. (1999) 
summarise the effects of several US programmes. They find that temporary wage subsidy 
programmes increase the probability of finding jobs in the subsidy period, but not in the long 
run, and that job search courses and counselling shorten unemployment duration. The surveys 
in both Stanley et al. (1999) and Heckman et al. (1999) conclude that effects are 
heterogeneous: some ALMPs may have positive effects for unemployed with a weak position 
in the labour market, but for other groups the effects are smaller if at all positive. Our findings 3 
of rather strong positive effects for non-western immigrants in Denmark are consistent with 
these previous results, since these immigrants in general have a weak position in the Danish 
labour market because of language problems and a low level of education or non-transferable 
education from their country of origin. The findings in the surveys of European labour market 
programmes by Kluve (2006) and Card et al. (2010) are similar to those for the US: ‘private-
sector incentive programmes’ (including wage subsidies) and ‘services and sanctions’ 
(including job search assistance, counselling, and sanctions for non-compliance) typically 
have positive employment effects, whereas ‘traditional labour market training’ (including 
classroom training and on-the-job training) has much smaller and often insignificant effects, 
and ‘direct employment programmes in the public sector’ are rarely effective and often have 
negative employment effects. Card et al. (2010) do show, however, that these negative effects 
tend to become smaller when effects are studies over a longer time perspective. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting. 
Section 3 develops the econometric model. Section 4 describes the data used in the empirical 
analysis. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes and discusses policy implications. 
 
2. Institutional setting 
In Denmark, membership of an unemployment insurance fund is voluntary, and membership 
of a given fund may be restricted by education and previous employment. Only members will 
receive UI benefits if they become unemployed. Non-insured workers who become 
unemployed may instead receive social assistance benefits which are means-tested. As 
discussed above, we focus on non-insured immigrants in this paper because there are 
considerably more non-western immigrants who are non-insured than insured, and, in 
particular, immigrants are over-represented among long-term recipients of social assistance. 4 
Therefore, the effect of programmes aimed at labour market integration of non-western 
immigrants receiving social assistance is of particular interest. 
Social assistance recipients will receive ALMP offers from the local authorities, 
and they have to participate in such a programme in order to remain eligible for social 
security benefits, which are of unlimited duration. A wide range of ALMPs are being used. In 
this paper we distinguish between three types: employment with a wage subsidy (mainly in 
the private sector), direct employment programme (mainly in the public sector), and other 
programmes which include education, training, and counselling programmes.  
According to national law, persons should be offered participation in a 
programme within 12 months from the beginning of the social-assistance spell.  
 
3. Econometric model 
We use the timing-of-events duration model of Abbring and van den Berg (2003). We model 
the duration of the social assistance spell to regular employment simultaneously with the 
duration from the beginning of the social assistance spell until entry into active labour market 
programmes. The duration of the social assistance spell includes the time spent in ALMPs. 
The model takes account of non-random selection into these programmes with respect to 
observable and unobservable covariates. Assuming mixed proportional hazard (MPH) rates 
and no anticipation effects, the treatment effects (i.e. the effects of participating in labour 
market programmes) are non-parametrically identified; see Abbring and van den Berg (2003). 
The no-anticipation assumption requires that a treatment starting at time t should not affect 
the outcome state (employment or non-employment) before time t. This may be a reasonable 
assumption in the present application since typically social assistance recipients are not able 
to predict neither time of treatment nor the specific programme to which they may be 
assigned. First of all, municipalities have a large degree of discretion regarding the timing of 5 
treatment, some offer programmes at a very early stage of social assistance receipt, while 
others typically do not meet the 12-month criterion. In addition, there is a significant variation 
regarding assignment to ALMPs between case workers within municipalities, and finally 
programme participation decisions are taken at meetings with case workers, the timing of 
which is also random to some extent. Thus, the starting times vary a lot for each category of 
programmes, and for all types of programmes taken together the standard deviation of 
duration until treatment is 15 months; see Table 1 (in the next section).  
Given the no-anticipation and MPH assumptions, no exclusion restrictions are 
needed. The intuition behind the identification strategy intrinsic to the timing-of-events model 
is that there is some random variation in the duration until treatment. This enables a 
separation between the treatment effect and the unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed 
time-invariant.  
The baseline hazard rate is modelled flexibly by a piecewise constant function, 
and time-varying variables are used for modelling in- and post-programme effects of ALMPs.  
Normalising the time at which immigrants begin a social assistance spell to zero, 
the non-negative stochastic variables Tu and Tp measure duration until employment and 
duration until programme participation, respectively. By construction,  . pu TT   If  pu TT  , the 
immigrant participates in a programme, and if  pu TT  , he does not (the duration until 
participation is right-censored).  
  Let  () xt   be  a  vector  of  observed  time-varying  variables,  and  let  u    and 
1 ( ,..., ) p p pJ     denote unobserved variables affecting the hazard rates to employment and to 
participation in each of the J programmes, respectively. The hazard rate to participation in 
programme j is 
 6 
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where    pj p t   are piecewise constant baseline hazard rates, 
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In  this  application ,  where  the  time  unit  is months,  1 2 3 4 3,   6,   12,   24. h h h h       The 
hazard  rate  to  programme  participation  is  the  sum  of  the  hazard  rates  to  the  specific 
programmes: 
 
         
1
| , | ,
J
p p p p pj p p pj
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t x t t x t    
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Participation in the J different programmes is denoted by two time-varying 1J-dimensional 
vectors of dummy variables,  1() dt and  2( ). dt The jth element of  1() dt is equal to 1 if the 
individual is participating in programme j at time t, and 0 otherwise; at most, one element of 
1() dt is equal to 1 at time t. Similarly, the jth element of  2() dt  is equal to 1 if the individual 
participated in programme j before time t, but is no longer participating, and 0 otherwise. We 
only  consider  effects  of  the  first  programme  during  a  social  assistance  spell;  if  a  person 
participates  in  a  second  programme,  the  observation  is  right-censored  at  the  time  this 
participation begins. 
  The exit rate to employment is given by 
 7 
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where the baseline hazard    uu t   has a form similar to (2), and  ,  1   and  2   are vectors of 
parameters;    is the effect of the control variables,  1   the in-programme effect, and  2   the 
post-programme effect after completed programme participation. The model takes account of 
endogeneity of  1() dt and  2() dt  through possible correlation between the unobserved variables 
u   and  . p   
  Let c be a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person exits to employment and 0 
otherwise; similarly, let  1 j c   if the person participates in programme j. Then the contribution 
to the likelihood function of a specific spell, given observed variables, is 
     
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The likelihood function is 
 
    ,, u p u p L L dF            (6) 
 
where F is the distribution function of  ( , ). up   We take account of the fact that a given 
person may have more than one social assistance spell. To simplify the estimation, we apply a 
discrete distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984). Specifically, we assume that ( , ) up   has a 
discrete distribution with 22 mass points. This implies that the unobserved components of 8 
the  selection  into  the  J  different  programmes  are  perfectly  correlated,  but  the  correlation 
between  u   and  p   is unrestricted.  
 
3.1 Marginal effects on the hazard rate and on the duration to employment 
The marginal effects of the control variables on the hazard rate to employment are given by 
the coefficients  u   (ignoring the effects via programme participation). Thus, the coefficient of 
the h
th explanatory variable,  , uh   is equal to the change in the logarithm of the hazard rate to 
employment when this  variable is changed by  1 unit holding all other variables constant. 
Similarly,  1    and  2    are  the  marginal  in-programme  and  post-programme  effects, 
respectively,  of  participation  in  labour  market  programmes  on  the  log  hazard  rate  to 
employment.  
  The  total  effect  of  participation  in  a  specific  programme  on  the  expected 
duration  until  employment  depends  of  course  on  1    and  2,    but  also  on  the timing  and 
duration of the programme and on the basic level of the hazard rate to employment (since  1   
and  2   affect the hazard rate multiplicatively) determined by individual characteristics. We 
calculate the marginal effects of programme participation for a ‘reference person’ given a 
range  of  typical  programme  starting  times  and  durations.  These  marginal  effects  are 
calculated  as  the  difference  in  expected  mean  duration  to  employment  with  and  without 
programme participation. In these calculations we use restricted mean durations, i.e. expected 
mean durations up to a predetermined endpoint, Tmax (which is taken to be five years).  
  Let  12 ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( )) z t x t d t d t   denote the vector of covariates. Let 
1() zt denote 
the covariates when an individual is assigned to a given programme at a given time and with a 
given duration, and let 
0() zt  denote covariates when the individual is not assigned to any 9 
programme.  Then  the  marginal  effect  of  this  programme  is  defined  as  the  difference  in 
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where the restricted expected duration is the expected area under the survivor curve up to time 
Tmax 
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and the survivor function is calculated from the hazard rate: 
 
    0 exp ( | ( ))
t
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Details on the calculation of marginal effects are described in Section 5. 
 
4. Data 
We use data from several administrative registers, which are collected and merged by 
Statistics Denmark. Our data set covers the period 1984-2004 and contains all immigrants in 
Denmark, but we restrict the analysis to immigrants from non-western countries.
2 
We further restrict the sample to persons who were residents in Denmark in 
1997 or 1998 due to the fact that there was a major institutional change in 1999 affecting 
newly arrived immigrants, and also that the administrative data on ALMP participation for 
immigrants who got their residence permit in 1999 are incomplete. Also, we restrict the 10 
analysis to immigrants who began a social assistance spell between January 1997 and 
December 2003 due to the fact that data on participation in ALMPs are only available from 
1997 onwards. Finally, we restrict the analysis to social assistance spells where the 
immigrants were 18-66 years of age when the spell began. 
The final estimation sample contains 66,768 social assistance spells, 31,215 for 
women and 35,553 for men; see Table 1.  
The upper panel of Table 1 shows figures for both women and men. For 38% of 
the social assistance spells, the immigrant is participating in an activation programme. Of 
those who participate in programmes, 7.4% concerns employment with a wage subsidy, and 
26.7% direct employment programmes. Durations of each type of activation programme vary 
a lot (mean duration is 5-6 months with a standard deviation of 4-6 months), but one reason 
for this is that some programmes are interrupted, for instance because the participant finds a 
job. There is also a large variation in the time of entry into programmes: On average, 
immigrants who participate in a programme enter about 13 months after the start of the social 
assistance spell, and the standard deviation is 15 months. 34% of all the immigrant social 
assistance spells have employment as destination state. The percentage is 39 for spells not 
involving ALMP participation and 26 for spells with ALMP participation, varying from 51% 
for employment with wage subsidy to 20 for ‘other programmes’. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The two lower panels in Table 1 show figures for women and men, separately. The fraction 
participating in employment programmes is larger for men, whereas the fraction participating 
in ‘other programmes’ is larger for women. The average duration of direct employment 
programmes and ‘other programmes’ is about 1 month longer for women than for men, and 11 
women are enrolled in these programmes much later than men (about 3 and 6 months later, 
respectively). The probability of employment as the destination state is considerably larger for 
men than for women, especially for social assistance spells not involving ALMP participation 
and for spells with participation in ‘other programmes’.  
Durations of the social assistance spells are in general very long, and 
considerably longer for women than for men. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by non-parametric 
Kaplan-Meier survival functions.  For women, the probability that a social assistance spell 
lasts at least 12, 24, 48 and 84 months is 79, 71, 61 and 54%, respectively. For men the 
corresponding percentages are 67, 54, 43 and 37.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We estimate separate models for men and women. Control variables in the analyses are 
measured in the year where the social assistance spell began. Controls are variables for years 
since migration, country of origin, type of residence permit, age, whether the person has 
children in different age groups, whether the person is single, working experience in 
Denmark, type of municipality, education, health indicators based on the number of yearly 
doctor visits, the local unemployment rate in the commuting area of the municipality, and the 
calendar year in which the social assistance spell began. Table A1 in the Appendix contains 
descriptive statistics for the control variables.  
 
5. Results 
Table 2 shows the main estimation results. The first columns show the estimation result for 
women, and the last columns the result for men. Table 2 shows results for parameters related 
to ALMP participation only. Estimated parameters of other explanatory variables are shown 12 
in the Appendix, Table A2. For each of the three types of ALMPs, Table 2 shows parameter 
estimates for in-programme and post-programme effects. Furthermore, we allow these 
parameters to differ according to whether the immigrant entered the programme earlier than 
six months after the start of the social assistance spell, or later. Thus, the table shows for each 
gender six estimates of in-programme effects and six estimates of post-programme effects. All 
estimates of post-programme effects are positive and clearly significant. Employment with a 
wage subsidy has the largest effect followed by direct employment programmes. For all three 
types of ALMPs, the post-programme effects on the hazard rate to employment are larger if 
the activation period begins after six months (rather than during the first six months of the 
social assistance spell).  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, most in-programme effects are also positive, indicating that ALMP 
participation increases the hazard rate to ordinary employment also during participation. The 
standard finding here is one of lock-in effects during programme participation. The only 
exception is for subsidized employment spells which begin less than six months after the start 
of the social assistance spell; here we do find a lock-in effect, but it is only marginally 
significant. Clausen et al. (2009) also find positive, but insignificant, in-programme effects 
for subsidized employment programmes for newly arrived immigrants. Another surprising 
feature of the estimates is that the positive in-programme effect is larger than the post-
programme effect for direct employment programmes and ‘other programmes’ beginning at 
least six months after the start of the social assistance spell (and for males the two types of 
effects are about equal in size for direct employment and ‘other’ programmes beginning 
within the first six months of the social assistance spell).  13 
  One reason why the estimated in-programme effects are positive and rather large 
may be that immigrants on social assistance benefits in general have weak qualifications, 
including weak host country language proficiency, and only a limited knowledge of the 
Danish labour market. Participating in ALMPs may therefore be particularly important for 
immigrants’ employment chances, also because participation may serve as a positive signal to 
employers who may have more difficulties assessing the qualifications of immigrants than of 
natives.  
  The estimated parameters – and thereby the relative effects on the hazard rate to 
employment – are generally larger for women than for men, but the initial level of the hazard 
rate to employment is considerably lower for women than for men. The post-programme 
parameter of subsidized employment starting after six months for women is 2.4 indicating a 
tenfold increase in the hazard rate to employment. The corresponding parameter for men (1.9) 
indicates a fivefold increase in the hazard rate. The corresponding in-programme parameters 
of 1.3 and 0.84 indicate increases in the hazard rate to employment of 277% and 132%, 
respectively. 
Table 3 shows the marginal effects of participation in activation programmes on 
the restricted mean duration to employment over a five-year period, calculated from a large 
number of typical programme spells. The effects are calculated for a ‘reference person’. The 
characteristics chosen for this person (which affect the size of the marginal effects, but not 
their sign or statistical significance) are given by the reference categories of each set of 
categorised variables (less than 5 years since migration, from former Yugoslavia, refugee, age 
above 45 years, has children below 2 years of age (but no older children), cohabiting, no 
working experience in Denmark, lives in a big city, education unknown, 1-4 visits to the 
doctor, the social assistance spell began in 1997)  and by the average of the local 
unemployment rate. If such a person did not participate in any activation programme, the 14 
restricted mean duration to employment would be 55 months for a woman and 42.4 months 
for a man (see the first row in Table 3). These numbers are very large; the maximum would be 
60 months (given that it is restricted to be at most 5 years).  
Given the values of the control variables, the restricted mean duration when 
participating in a given programme depends on the duration until entering the programme and 
the duration of the programme. Starting time and duration of a given programme vary a lot 
(see Table 1). Therefore, we calculate ‘the’ marginal effect of a given programme as an 
average over several typical variants of the programme defined by starting time and duration. 
Specifically, we use the following simplifying assumptions. Programme spells may have three 
different starting times and durations defined by the first, second and third quartile in the 
observed distributions of starting times and durations (for women and men, respectively). 
These quartiles are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix. Thus, there are nine different types of 
a given programme, and it is assumed that each type has equal probability 1/9.  
Participation in ALMPs leads to a large reduction in the restricted mean duration 
to employment as shown in Table 3. Employment with a wage subsidy shortens the restricted 
mean duration by 10 months for women and by 15 months for men, which are very large 
effects. The effects of direct employment programmes and ‘other ALMPs’ are smaller, but 
also large; they reduce restricted mean durations by about 4 and 2 months, respectively. 
Again, the estimated effects are larger for men than for women.  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The estimated marginal effects in Table 3 are clearly significant. Standard errors of the 
marginal effects are calculated from simulations of the estimated parameters. Given the 
estimated parameters and their estimated covariance matrix, we draw 500 random parameter 15 
vectors, and calculate the marginal effects for each parameter vector. The estimated standard 
error of the marginal effect of a given programme is the standard deviation of the 500 
calculated marginal effects of this programme. 
To our knowledge, only one earlier study has focused on effects of ALMPs for 
immigrants receiving social assistance. Thus, Clausen et al. (2009) analysed effects for newly 
arrived immigrants in Denmark and found significant effects for subsidized employment (a 
reduction in the restricted mean duration to employment of about four months over a four-
year period), but not for direct employment programmes or other programmes.  Comparing 
our results to the broader literature on effects of ALMPs on labour market outcomes (see the 
surveys in Stanley et al., 1999; Heckman et al., 1999; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002; Kluve, 2006; 
Card et al., 2010), the positive effect of employment with a wage subsidy on the hazard rate 
to regular employment is consistent with most previous studies. Our finding of significant and 
rather large effects for direct employment programmes is less consistent with previous 
findings, since most studies find only small and often insignificant effects. Our category 
‘other programmes’, for which we find a small but significant effect, includes very different 
programmes such as training, special employment programmes and counselling. Most 
previous studies find positive effects of counselling, marginally positive effects of special 
employment programmes and small positive or insignificant effects of training. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Using the timing of events duration model and a large administrative data set, this study finds 
large and substantial positive effects of having participated in ALMPs on the hazard rate to 
regular employment for immigrants receiving social assistance in Denmark. We estimate 
separate effects for three categories of programmes, and we allow both in-programme and 
post-programme effects to differ according to whether the program began before or after 6 16 
months. The post-programme effects are largest for subsidized employment programmes. We 
also find positive in-programme effects except for subsidized employment programmes 
starting early. Both lock-in and post-programme effects are much larger when the program 
begins at least six months after the start of the social assistance spell.  
The total effect of ALMP participation depends on both in-programme and post-
programme effects. To assess the overall effect, we calculate the marginal effects on the mean 
duration to regular employment over a five-year period, given a range of typical starting times 
and durations of ALMP sub-spells. Subsidized employment programmes reduce the duration 
of social assistance spells by 10-15 months, direct employment programmes reduce it by 
about 4 months, and other programmes by about 2 months.  
The finding that subsidized employment is the most effective type of ALMP is 
consistent with an earlier study focussing on newly arrived immigrants and with other studies 
of ALMP effects for unemployed in general. However, this type of ALMP is by far the least 
frequently applied in Denmark; only 7.4% of ALMPs offered to immigrants on social 
assistance are subsidized employment programmes (4.9% for females and 9.6% for males). 
Our results thus indicate that labour market integration of immigrants may be improved 
considerably by targeting subsidized employment programmes to unemployed immigrants.  
Since we also estimate considerable positive effects of direct employment 
programmes and other programmes for immigrants – effects which are larger than similar 
effects for unemployed in general found in other studies – offering these programmes to a 
larger number of unemployed immigrants may also be beneficial to labour market integration 
and labour supply in general. 
However, even though our results indicate large beneficial effects of an 
intensified use of ALMPs for immigrants, it may not be optimal to offer these programmes at 
a very early state of the unemployment/social assistance spell since our estimates indicate 17 
much larger positive effects on the hazard rate to employment if the ALMPs begin after six 
months of social assistance receipt. Such a decision requires weighing the costs of 
programmes against the saved social assistance.  
In conclusion, we have found very large positive employment effects of ALMPS 
for non-western immigrants, suggesting a much more active role for activation policies in 
national strategies for integrating immigrants into the country. Also, we would definitely 
advocate more research on the topic. 
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Appendix 
Tables A1 and A2 show descriptive statistics and parameter estimates, respectively, for 
control variables. Table A3 shows characteristics of ALMP spells used to calculate marginal 
effects, namely the quartiles in the distributions of duration of social assistance spells until 
start of programme and time spent in the programme, respectively.  
 
[Table A1 ABOUT HERE] 
[Table A2 ABOUT HERE] 
[Table A3 ABOUT HERE] 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of immigrants’ social assistance spells and ALMP participation  
 
Social assistance  ALMP  Duration of ALMP  Duration of spell until  Spells with 
 
spells  spells  subspells (months)  start of ALMP (months) employment destination 
 
N  per cent  per cent  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  N  per cent 
Females and males 
                  Social assistance spells with ALMPs  25,541  38.3  100.0  5.8  6.1  13.4  15.3  6,664  26 
  - Employment with wage subsidy  1,893  2.8  7.4  5.3  4.2  8.6  10.2  959  51 
  - Direct employment programme  6,814  10.2  26.7  5.7  6.0  11.2  13.1  2,273  33 
  - Other programmes  16,834  25.2  65.9  5.9  6.3  14.8  16.4  3,432  20 
Social assistance spells with no ALMP  41,227  61.7 
         
15,916  39 
All  66,768  100.0 
 
5.8  6.1  13.4  15.3  22,580  34 
                    Females 
          Social assistance spells with ALMPs  11,802  37.8  100.0  6.3  6.3  16.2  17.5  2,575  22 
  - Employment with wage subsidy  573  1.8  4.9  5.4  4.2  8.5  10.1  278  49 
  - Direct employment programme  2,958  9.5  25.1  6.2  6.1  13.1  14.9  953  32 
  - Other programmes  8,271  26.5  70.1  6.4  6.5  17.9  18.4  1,344  16 
Social assistance spells with no ALMP  19,413  62.2 
         
5,984  31 
All  31,215  100.0 
 
6.3  6.3  16.2  17.5  8,559  27 
                    Males 
          Social assistance spells with ALMPs  13,739  38.6  100.0  5.3  5.9  10.9  12.7  4,089  30 
  - Employment with wage subsidy  1,320  3.7  9.6  5.2  4.3  8.7  10.2  681  52 
  - Direct employment programme  3,856  10.8  28.1  5.3  5.9  9.8  11.3  1,320  34 
  - Other programmes  8,563  24.1  62.3  5.3  6.0  11.7  13.6  2,088  24 
Social assistance spells with no ALMP  21,814  61.4 
         
9,932  46 
All  35,553  100.0 
 
5.3  5.9  10.9  12.7  14,021  39 
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Table 2. Estimates of effects of participation in ALMPs on the hazard rate to employment  
     Females     Males 
    Coeff.  SE      Coeff.  SE   
                 
ALMP spell begins less than 6 months after start of social assistance spell 
Lock-in effects: 
    Employment with wage subsidy    -0.2394  0.1505       -0.1887  0.0917  ** 
    Direct employment programme    0.4131  0.0702  ***    0.3791  0.0537  *** 
    Other ALMPs    0.1693  0.0616  ***    0.1588  0.0446  *** 
Post-programme effects: 
    Employment with wage subsidy    1.4287  0.1333  ***    1.2430  0.0805  *** 
    Direct employment programme    0.6844  0.0920  ***    0.3757  0.0718  *** 
    Other ALMPs    0.2369  0.0769  ***    0.1240  0.0570  ** 
                 
ALMP spell begins at least 6 months after start of social assistance spell 
Lock-in effects: 
    Employment with wage subsidy    1.3192  0.1786  ***    0.8382  0.1100  *** 
    Direct employment programme    1.5442  0.0695  ***    1.0925  0.0607  *** 
    Other ALMPs    0.9390  0.0563  ***    0.7245  0.0505  *** 
Post-programme effects: 
    Employment with wage subsidy    2.4127  0.1235  ***    1.8976  0.0738  *** 
    Direct employment programme    1.2847  0.0871  ***    0.4565  0.0861  *** 
    Other ALMPs    0.5277  0.0701  ***    0.3266  0.0607  *** 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Parameter estimates for the other explanatory variables and for the duration dependent 
constant terms are shown in the Appendix, Table A2.  
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Table 3. Marginal effects of labour market programmes: Change in restricted mean duration 
of social assistance spells over a five-year period (measured in months)  
  Females    Males 














No ALMP  55.0 
     
42.4 
    Employment with wage subsidy  45.1  -9.9  1.3 
 
27.3  -15.1  1.0 
Direct employment programme  51.4  -3.7  0.5 
 
37.8  -4.6  0.6 
Other ALMPs  53.5  -1.5  0.2 
 
39.8  -2.6  0.4 
 
Note: The calculation of marginal effects is described in the text.  
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Variable  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
 
Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Years since migration: 5-9  0.248  0.432  0  1 
 
0.232  0.422  0  1 
Years since migration: 10-19  0.183  0.386  0  1 
 
0.235  0.424  0  1 
Years since migration: 20-  0.166  0.372  0  1 
 
0.176  0.381  0  1 
From Turkey  0.151  0.358  0  1 
 
0.114  0.318  0  1 
From Europe (except former Yugoslavia)  0.090  0.286  0  1 
 
0.082  0.274  0  1 
From Africa (except Somalia)  0.071  0.256  0  1 
 
0.081  0.273  0  1 
From Somalia  0.096  0.294  0  1 
 
0.120  0.325  0  1 
From American countries  0.021  0.144  0  1 
 
0.017  0.129  0  1 
From Afghanistan  0.018  0.135  0  1 
 
0.023  0.148  0  1 
From Iraq  0.076  0.264  0  1 
 
0.118  0.322  0  1 
From Iran  0.050  0.218  0  1 
 
0.063  0.243  0  1 
From Sri Lanka  0.037  0.188  0  1 
 
0.025  0.155  0  1 
From other Asian countries  0.088  0.284  0  1 
 
0.044  0.205  0  1 
From Pakistan  0.043  0.203  0  1 
 
0.037  0.188  0  1 
From Libanon  0.059  0.236  0  1 
 
0.087  0.282  0  1 
From other countries  0.041  0.199  0  1 
 
0.043  0.203  0  1 
Family reunified to a refugee  0.128  0.334  0  1 
 
0.044  0.204  0  1 
Family reunified to non-refugee  0.169  0.375  0  1 
 
0.099  0.298  0  1 
EU residence permit  0.035  0.183  0  1 
 
0.020  0.140  0  1 
Unknown type of residence permit  0.313  0.464  0  1 
 
0.343  0.475  0  1 
Age 16-24  0.215  0.411  0  1 
 
0.189  0.391  0  1 
Age 25-34  0.400  0.490  0  1 
 
0.378  0.485  0  1 
Age 35-44  0.264  0.441  0  1 
 
0.309  0.462  0  1 
Children 3-6 years of age  0.194  0.395  0  1 
 
0.122  0.327  0  1 
Children 7-17 years of age  0.205  0.404  0  1 
 
0.123  0.329  0  1 
No children  0.321  0.467  0  1 
 
0.531  0.499  0  1 
Single  0.331  0.471  0  1 
 
0.423  0.494  0  1 
Working experience up to 1 year  0.224  0.417  0  1 
 
0.279  0.448  0  1 
Working experience 1-3 years  0.112  0.315  0  1 
 
0.175  0.380  0  1 
Working experience 3 years or more  0.064  0.245  0  1 
 
0.120  0.325  0  1 
Lives in provincial town municipality  0.343  0.475  0  1 
 
0.326  0.469  0  1 
Lives in a rural district  0.113  0.317  0  1 
 
0.097  0.296  0  1 
Danish education  0.166  0.372  0  1 
 
0.217  0.413  0  1 
Years of Danish education  1.694  3.858  0  20 
 
2.205  4.281  0  20 
Foreign education  0.346  0.476  0  1 
 
0.325  0.468  0  1 
Years of foreign eduction  3.876  5.656  0  18 
 
3.957  5.962  0  18 
No visits to doctors  0.150  0.357  0  1 
 
0.241  0.428  0  1 
5-9 visits to doctors  0.270  0.444  0  1 
 
0.207  0.405  0  1 
10-19 visits to doctors  0.220  0.414  0  1 
 
0.108  0.310  0  1 
20 or more visits to doctors  0.076  0.265  0  1 
 
0.025  0.156  0  1 
Local unemployment rate x 10  0.621  0.150  0.326  1.361 
 
0.622  0.150  0.317  1.361 
Social assistance spell began 1998  0.192  0.394  0  1 
 
0.194  0.396  0  1 
Social assistance spell began 1999  0.178  0.382  0  1 
 
0.191  0.393  0  1 
Social assistance spell began 2000  0.110  0.313  0  1 
 
0.111  0.314  0  1 
Social assistance spell began 2001  0.108  0.311  0  1 
 
0.105  0.307  0  1 
Social assistance spell began 2002  0.098  0.297  0  1 
 
0.095  0.293  0  1 
Social assistance spell began 2003  0.090  0.287  0  1 
 
0.080  0.271  0  1 
Note. Reference categories are: Years since migration less than five years; from former Yugoslavia; 
refugee; 45-66 years of age; children 0-2 years of age; married or cohabiting; no working experience 
(in Denmark); lives in the metropolitan area of Copenhagen or one of the three largest provincial cities 
in Denmark; education unknown; 1-4 visits to doctors; spell began in 1997. 
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Table A2. Estimated parameters for controls in the hazard rate to employment 
  Females    Males 
   Coeff.  SE      Coeff.  SE   
Years since migration: 5-9  0.276  0.038  ***    0.134  0.029  *** 
Years since migration: 10-19  0.008  0.053       -0.102  0.040  *** 
Years since migration: 20-  -0.126  0.050  ***    -0.092  0.038  *** 
From Turkey  -0.455  0.063  ***    -0.228  0.049  *** 
From Europe (except former Yugoslavia)  -0.353  0.060  ***    -0.322  0.048  *** 
From Africa (except Somalia)  -0.360  0.067  ***    -0.267  0.051  *** 
From Somalia  -0.971  0.071  ***    -0.532  0.048  *** 
From American countries  -0.176  0.094  *    -0.275  0.092  *** 
From Afghanistan  -0.574  0.124  ***    -0.249  0.076  *** 
From Iraq  -0.851  0.076  ***    -0.458  0.044  *** 
From Iran  -0.253  0.075  ***    -0.176  0.052  *** 
From Sri Lanka  0.226  0.077  ***    0.057  0.065    
From other Asian countries  -0.119  0.062  *    -0.170  0.056  *** 
From Pakistan  -0.676  0.084  ***    -0.135  0.063  ** 
From Libanon  -0.998  0.084  ***    -0.485  0.052  *** 
From other countries  -0.588  0.082  ***    -0.388  0.056  *** 
Family reunified to a refugee  -0.262  0.058  ***    -0.110  0.063  * 
Family reunified to non-refugee  0.074  0.052       0.117  0.044  *** 
EU residence permit  0.082  0.079       -0.011  0.079    
Unknown type of residence permit  -0.145  0.050  ***    -0.288  0.037  *** 
Age 16-24  1.221  0.061  ***    1.132  0.048  *** 
Age 25-34  1.068  0.050  ***    0.799  0.037  *** 
Age 35-44  0.803  0.048  ***    0.475  0.034  *** 
Children 3-6 years of age  0.299  0.038  ***    0.109  0.032  *** 
Children 7-17 years of age  0.544  0.042  ***    0.214  0.035  *** 
No children  0.415  0.039  ***    0.035  0.034    
Single  -0.163  0.029  ***    -0.095  0.031  *** 
Working experience up to 1 year  1.675  0.035  ***    1.296  0.028  *** 
Working experience 1-3 years  1.860  0.044  ***    1.667  0.033  *** 
Working experience 3 years or more  1.776  0.058  ***    1.779  0.042  *** 
Lives in provincial town municipality  -0.078  0.032  ***    0.026  0.024    
Lives in a rural district  0.111  0.045  ***    0.167  0.037  *** 
Danish education  -1.536  0.142  ***    -1.280  0.114  *** 
Years of Danish education  0.178  0.012  ***    0.126  0.010  *** 
Foreign education  -0.420  0.087  ***    -0.387  0.078  *** 
Years of foreign eduction  0.052  0.007  ***    0.044  0.006  *** 
No visits to doctors  -0.163  0.043  ***    0.024  0.025    
5-9 visits to doctors  -0.083  0.031  ***    -0.152  0.025  *** 
10-19 visits to doctors  -0.346  0.035  ***    -0.512  0.033  *** 
20 or more visits to doctors  -0.651  0.054  ***    -0.899  0.067  *** 
Local unemployment rate x 10  -0.620  0.135  ***    -0.689  0.107  *** 
Social assistance spell began 1998  -0.075  0.044  *    -0.117  0.034  *** 
Social assistance spell began 1999  -0.162  0.052  ***    -0.211  0.040  *** 
Social assistance spell began 2000  -0.047  0.058       -0.141  0.045  *** 
Social assistance spell began 2001  -0.236  0.062  ***    -0.207  0.049  *** 
Social assistance spell began 2002  -0.267  0.064  ***    -0.441  0.051  *** 
Social assistance spell began 2003  -0.355  0.061  ***    -0.415  0.048  *** 
Duration 0-3 months  -5.432  0.153  ***    -4.171  0.118  *** 
Duration 3-6 months  -6.168  0.154  ***    -4.931  0.120  *** 
Duration 6-12 months  -6.406  0.152  ***    -5.113  0.119  *** 
Duration 12-24 months  -6.751  0.151  ***    -5.410  0.118  *** 
Duration 24- months  -7.033  0.150  ***    -5.811  0.118  *** 26 
Note. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The last 
five variables are the duration dependent constant terms. See the note to Table A1 for 
reference categories of the explanatory variables. 
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Table A3. Characteristics of ALMP spells used to calculate marginal effects: Quartiles in the 
distributions of duration of social assistance spells until start of programme and time spent in 
the programme 
   
Females 
     
Males 
  Quartile  First  Second  Third 
 
First  Second  Third 
 
Duration until start of programme (in months) 
Employment with wage subsidy  2  5  11 
 
2  5  11 
Direct employment programme  2  7  19 
 
2  5  13 
Other programmes  3  11  26 
 
2  6  16 
               
 
Duration of programme (in months) 
Employment with wage subsidy  3  5  7 
 
3  5  7 
Direct employment programme  2  5  7 
 
2  3  6 
Other programmes  2  4  9 
 
2  3  6 
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1 The timing-of-events duration model has been used to evaluate ALMPs in several 
previous  studies;  see  e.g.,  Richardson  and  van  den  Berg  (2001),  Bolvig  et  al. 
(2003), van den Berg et al. (2004), Abbring et al. (2005), Crépon et al. (2005), 
Lalive et al. (2005, 2008), Clausen et al. (2009), and Rosholm and Svarer (2008). 
2 Non-western countries are defined as countries which are not Nordic, not in the EU (as 
of  May  2004),  and  not  the  US,  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  Switzerland, 
Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, or San Marino. 